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Abstract
In this paper we address the issue of grounding for experien-
tial concepts. Given that perceptual demonstratives are a basic
form of such concepts, we examine ways of fixing the refer-
ents of such demonstratives. To avoid ‘encodingism’, that is,
relating representations to representations, we postulate that
the process of reference fixing must be bottom-up and non-
conceptual, so that it can break the circle of conceptual con-
tent and touch the world. For that purpose, an appropriate
causal relation between representations and the world is
needed. We claim that this relation is provided by spatial and
object-centered attention that leads to the formation of object-
files through the function of deictic acts. This entire causal
process takes place at a pre-conceptual level, meeting the re-
quirement for a solution to the grounding problem. Finally we
claim that our account captures fundamental insights in Put-
nam’s and Kripke’s work on “new” reference.
Introduction
John Campbell (1997) claims that the problem of the
reference of concepts is the problem of relating concepts
with imagistic content. His ‘imagistic content’ is the content
of our experiences as we consciously access it and use it to
see things as ‘being such and such’. The most basic form of
reference is when one perceives a thing and refers to it on
the basis of one’s perception by using a demonstrative, such
as, “that” or “this”. The reference of such a perceptual de-
monstrative is determined by spatial attention.
Though Campbell’s thesis regarding the importance of
spatial attention and perceptual demonstratives in estab-
lishing the reference of concepts to spatiotemporal objects
goes in the right direction, his account has some serious
problems. The main issue we wish to take on here is his
view that the matter of the reference of concepts is ex-
hausted by relating propositional with pictorial content. The
problem is that both propositional and experiential content
are representations, while the issue of reference is supposed
to be a matter of grounding representations to the world, not
of relating representations of different kinds to each other.
This classical threat of infinite regress is now known under
the label of ‘encodingism’, the view that representations are
connected with the represented entities via some kind of
correspondence between the two (see the critique in Bick-
hard, 1993 and Christiansen and Chater, 1993). Solutions
that propose some such correspondence that, in turn, stands
in need of an ‘interpretation’ cannot answer the symbol
grounding problem, since they fail to account for how
“symbol meaning [is] to be grounded in something other
than just more meaningless symbols.” (Harnad, 1990) The
encoding of symbols in further symbols cannot be the solu-
tion.
We know that the problem has a solution since (some
of) our concepts do have reference. A solution that does not
fall into the trap of encodingism could be provided if we
could single out a non-symbolic connection between our
representations and the world. It seems plausible that such a
connection is a causal one and that it would take place with-
out the involvement of conceptual (i. e. symbolic) means.
This is where Campbell has pointed in the right direction.
So, our task is to give a contribution to the problem
how the concepts in the mind of a particular speaker can re-
fer to objects in the world. How is it possible that I can use
the concept “house” to refer successfully to certain objects?
We need to single out a causal process, that could be a
grounding for such reference (and that would not presup-
pose concepts). Once such a grounding is laid, the speaker
can expand the initial grounding from experientially acces-
sible kinds of objects to objects to which he has no such ac-
cess (for contingent or principled reasons, as in the case of
abstract objects). Each use of a concept would depend on
such a grounding through a causal chain, starting from the
initial grounding(s). How the grounding of non-experiential
concepts takes place is not discussed in this paper.
In this paper we argue that spatial attention and/or ob-
ject-centered attention establish the referents of certain
kinds of concepts, namely perceptual demonstratives. De-
monstratives are a promising start because they might rely
on bodily movements in a context, not on conceptual enti-
ties that would require an interpretation. We first discuss
these forms of attention and the way they individuate ob-
jects, arguing that spatiotemporal information individuates
the referents and that this can be done in a bottom-up, non-
conceptual way.
Then we employ Garcia-Carpintero’s (2000) and De-
vitt’s (1996) theory of demonstratives to show how the
senses of demonstratives individuate their referents (demon-
strata). We claim that the senses of demonstratives use the
spatio-temporal information contained in the object files to
fix reference. The non-conceptual use of this information
provides the causal relation that grounds representations in
the world. To explain how individuation takes place we em-
ploy Ballard et. al.’s (1997) theory of deictic codes and
Kahneman and Treisman’s (1984) theory of object-files.
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Finally, in the third part of the paper, our thesis regard-
ing reference is discussed in the context of Putnam’s (1975,
1983; 1991) and Kripke’s (1980) “new” theory of reference.
We claim that the notion of an object-file containing pre-
dominantly spatio-temporal information provides the causal
connection with the world that Putnam and Kripke sought to
establish. We discuss the grounding of concepts whose ref-
erents are the basis of one’s perception when one uses a de-
monstrative. In this sense the solution provided here, even if
successful, is only the first step toward solving the problem
of concept grounding in general.
Individuating Objects
Campbell (1997) argues that object individuation takes
place by means of selective spatial attention that picks out
objects features, forms feature maps, and integrates those
that are found at the same location into forming objects in
the way described by Treisman’s Feature Integration The-
ory (FIT). In vision, information from different feature maps
is bound together by extracting the location encoded im-
plicitly in any feature information. Spatial attention makes
the implicit location explicit. Information localized at the
same location is bound together and thought to pertain to a
certain object that occupies that space.
FIT belongs to a family of theories that hold that when
one attends to an object then one automatically encodes all
of its features in visual working memory. Against this, there
is evidence for the existence of object-based attention which
overrides featural information (other than spatiotemporal in-
formation) and which on certain occasions may pick out
objects without any regard even for spatial information
(Scholl & Leslie, 2000; Scholl, 2001). The role of object
centered attention is primarily the parsing of a scene into
discrete persisting objects, and the selection of some among
these objects. The same evidence suggests that selection
based on spatio-temporal information occurs very early in
information processing (though segmentations of a scene
into various discrete objects probably occurs at all levels of
vision); in the case of vision it takes place in mid-level vi-
sion. Mid-level vision is bottom-up and cognitively im-
penetrable (Pylyshyn 1999; Raftopoulos, 2001), i. e. not ac-
cessible to conscious cognition, so it is not conceptual. In
other words, some form of the selection of objects and the
parsing of a scene is a bottom-up, cognitively impenetrable
process (Carey and Xu, 2001; Scholl, 2001). Such a process
would be a good candidate for the causal process we are
looking for.
Given the pre-conscious processes in mid-level vision,
we need to distinguish two steps: 1) object individuation,
the processes that selects objects as discrete entities that per-
sist in time, and 2) object identification, the processes that
lead to the representation of objects under a certain descrip-
tion. The latter involves a strong semantical component, in
the sense that the object represented has been identified as
being such and such (e. g. a house). The former involves a
much weaker level of representation. It purports to convey
the sense that an object file has been opened for that specific
object, that is, that the object has been “catalogued” or “in-
dexed” as something that exists and persists separately of
other objects with its own continuous spatio-temporal his-
tory – not as something that has certain properties (such as
that of being a house). Object-files are allocated and main-
tained primarily on the basis of spatiotemporal information.
Objects can be parsed and tracked without being identified.
This representation allows access to the object but it does
not describe the object. Object individuation does not re-
quire the existence of a concept associated with that object.
(Of course, in theory successful object identification could
also be used for individuation, as in definite descriptions
like “the large house with the porch”, but this presupposes
grounded symbols, so we are interested in the inverse: indi-
viduation without identification.)
As an example for object individuation, think of two
identical red squares that are situated in different locations.
Since they are identical with regard to their features, the
only way they could be treated as two distinct objects is by
considering their spatiotemporal history. This presupposes
that there is an object-centered attentional mechanism that is
sensitive only to spatiotemporal information and not to fea-
ture information, which can pick up these objects by open-
ing object-files. Precisely this conclusion is reached in the
MOT (Multiple Object Tracking) experiment (Pylyshyn &
Storm, 1988). In these experiments subjects must track a
number of independently moving identical objects, that are
initially tagged by attentional cues, among identical dis-
tractors. The success in MOT presupposes that the subjects
attend to spatiotemporal information (relative location and
direction of motion) and not to features, such as color and
shape, or even the actual location of the objects. One could
say that the attentional cues individuate/index in parallel the
targets by assigning them tags that the subject can follow
afterwards through motion. Thus, this mechanism individu-
ates these objects and allows the subject to follow their
paths and transformations while maintaining their identity
as distinct objects.
Carey and Xu (2001) argue that a mechanism tracking
the spatiotemporal history of objects precedes feature
tracking mechanisms, and that this mechanism may override
conflicting featural information. In other words, object indi-
viduation precedes feature identification – as we said above.
The cognizer does not “know” or “believe” that an object
moves in continuous paths, that it persists in time, though it
uses this information to index and follow the object. She
does not encode the object’s features in some concept. She
may not even have acquired the concept “object” (in this
sense, you can see a house without having the concept of
“house”). Object individuation may eventually result in the
belief that an object is here or there, but this indexing itself
does not appeal to some stored concepts regarding objects.
Hence, if object individuation establishes reference, then the
reference of demonstratives is not determined by a set of de-
scriptions of features.
The discussion of object based attention shows that ob-
ject files are opened and maintained on the basis of spatio-
temporal information by means of cognitively impenetrable
mechanisms. Petitot (1995) talks of the “positional (local)
content-structure” of the scene. This positional structure is
nonconceptual, and conveys information about nonvisual
properties, such as causal relations (e.g., X “transfers”
something to Y). In this latter category one can include the
functional properties of objects, referred to as ‘affordances’
of objects. Suppose that one witnesses a scene in which X
gives Z to Y. The semantics of the scene consists of two
parts: (i) the semantic content of X, Z, Y and “give” as a spe-
cific action, and (ii) the purely positional local content. The
latter is in fact the image scheme of the “transfer” type. X, Y,
and Z occupy a specific location in the space occupied by
the scene. In the image scheme, X, Y, Z are thus reduced to
featureless objects that occupy specific relative locations,
and in that sense can be viewed as pure abstract places.
More specifically, X, Y, and Z, which in a linguistic descrip-
tion of the scene are the semantic roles, “are reduced to pure
abstract places, locations that must be filled by ‘true’ par-
ticipants.” These places are related by means of an action, of
a “transfer” type.
Petitot’s “places” do not refer to the actual locations
that are occupied by the objects in a scene. What Petitot
seems to allude to using the spatial metaphor is the notion of
an object devoid of all features (including actual location),
except that it persists in time, and occupies some space –
similar to the talk of “two-place predicate”. It is this indi-
viduation of an object that Petitot seeks to describe by say-
ing that the objects’ only property is that they occupy their
own space and this is what the notion of objects as “pure ab-
stract places” purports to convey. In this framework, the
concepts that are used in the linguistic descriptions of a
scene are locational configurations, that is, spatial struc-
tures. Petitot describes the routines and algorithms of early
vision that might retrieve from the morphology of a scene in
a bottom-up manner the global positional information con-
tained in it.
Several theories of mechanisms of object indexing
(what we call “individuation”) have been proposed. They
include the FINST theory of visual indexing (Pylyshyn,
2001), the object-indexing theory (Scholl & Leslie, 1999),
the object-files theory of Kahneman & Treisman (1984) and
more recently Ballard’s et. al., (1997) theory of deictic
codes. The common thread of these theories is the claim that
there exists a level of (visual) processing in which objects
present in a scene are parsed and tracked as distinct individ-
ual objects without being recognized as particular objects
that are such and such. Thus, they stress the point that object
individuation precedes object identification and that there is
a level of object representation that does not encode features
and does not presuppose concepts; a preconceptual level of
object representation. We have already discussed «object-
files». We are now going to describe a plausible mechanism
that allows object individuation and tracking.
Deictic Codes, Object Individuation and Tracking
A recent theory of deictic pointers has been developed
by Ballard, et. al., (1997). They claim that at time scales of
approximately 1/3 of a second, orienting movements of the
body play a crucial role in cognition and form a useful com-
putational level. At this “embodiment level,” the constraints
of the physical system determine the nature of cognitive op-
erations. “The key synergy is that at time scales of about 1/3
of a second, the natural sequentiality of body movements
can be matched to the natural computational economies of
sequential decision systems through a system of implicit
reference called deictic in which pointing movements are
used to bind objects in the world to cognitive programs.”
Our discussion revolves around the issue of relating in-
ternal representational states with the world. We have em-
phasized the potential role played by non-conceptual proc-
esses in mediating the relation between representations and
the world. Now, as we mentioned, the shortest time at which
bodily actions and movements, such as eye movements,
hand movements, or spoken words, can be observed is the
1/3-second-time scale, the embodiment level. Thus, the
mechanisms that relate conceptual content with the world
through action must be sought at this level. Suppose that
one looks at a scene and selects a part of it through eye fo-
cusing. The brain’s representation is about, or refers to, that
specific part of the scene. Acts such as the eye focusing are
called “deictic strategies”, from the Greek word ‘deixis’
(pointing at), since they are analogous to pointing with
one’s hand. When one’s internal representation refers to an
object through such a deictic representation, this is a “deic-
tic reference.”
Eye fixation exemplifies the role of deictic mecha-
nisms, or pointers, as grounding devices, that is, as devices
that ground internal representations and cognitive programs
to objects in the world, through deictic reference. This
binding is implemented by two functional routines in the
visual system. When a scene is perceived, the eye move-
ments perform two main functions; they extract properties
of pointer locations (object identification) and they point to
aspects of the environment (object localization). The second
task is that of our object individuation.
Perceptual Demonstratives and Reference
Let us start by having a brief look at the three most in-
fluential accounts of demonstratives. The standard Fregean
analysis of demonstratives considers them similar to definite
descriptions and assigns them a reference (Bedeutung) and a
sense (the mode of presentation of the referred object).
Frege’s senses are descriptive, in that they provide descrip-
tions in terms of features of the singular term. However,
demonstratives do not function quite like definite descrip-
tions do, since demonstratives and indexicals in general are
rigid designators (Kripke, 1972) whereas definite descrip-
tions are not. A token of “that house” refers to the salient
house, while “the largest house in town” may refer to one
house today and to another next year. This has been used to
argue that the senses of demonstratives, if any, are not de-
scriptive. Below, we will argue that the ‘senses’ of demon-
stratives consist in causal chains that ground them in the
world (a thesis similar to that of Devitt, 1996, Kripke, 1980
and Putnam, 1975; 1991). The causal chains start with a di-
rect perceptual encounter with an object, an encounter that
grounds the demonstrative in the world. Devitt (1996, 164)
calls such an encounter a “grounding” – and we shall use
this for the “grounding problem”.
We join Garcia-Carpintero (2000), and Devitt (1996) in
the view that the difference between definite descriptions
and demonstratives does not discredit the role of senses of
demonstratives in determining their content. Our thesis is
that the content or meaning of a demonstrative consists both
of its referent and its sense. This is the second main account
of demonstratives. We will not argue in favor of this view,
though, because it is really not crucial to the main argument
developed in this paper, namely that reference construed as
object individuation can be fixed by means of bottom-up
perceptual processes that involve non conceptual content.
What is important to this argument is the existence of such a
process; this claim is independent of whether the referent is
part of the meaning of demonstratives. The argument, how-
ever, as we shall see, essentially involves the role of the
mode of presentation of a demonstrative in individuating
objects. Thus, our claims go against the third important con-
strual of demonstratives.
This is the direct reference theory, according to which
the only content of a demonstrative is its denotation, or in
other words, that the only linguistic function of a demon-
strative is that it refers to its demonstratum, its referent
(Kaplan, 1989). It does not have a sense. Paraphrasing
Kaplan’s (1989) account of the theory, one could say that a
demonstrative does not describe its referent as possessing
any identifying properties, it only refers to it. Though we
agree that demonstratives do not provide identifying de-
scriptions of their referent, we argue that they allow the in-
dividuation of the referent as a singular persisting object, by
means of object-centered attention and spatial attention.
These two  provide the causal chains that ground the de-
monstrative. Thus, the mode of presentation of a demon-
strative is not descriptive but causal. They can do that be-
cause they have a mode of presentation of the referent. But
what is the mode of presentation when one says for example
“that” pointing to a house?
Campbell (1997) thinks that the problem of the sense of
a perceptual demonstrative is a problem about selective at-
tention, in so far as he considers the mode of presentation to
provide imagistic information related to the referent. It is the
role of selective spatial attention to isolate that information
in a scene that pertains to the referent. Thus, Campbell takes
the mode of presentation of a demonstrative to include in-
formation that could individuate the referent on the basis of
its observable features and, in an essential manner, on the
basis of its spatial location. In fact, difference of location
only suffice to establish difference in the mode of presenta-
tion of the same object by two different demonstratives.
Garcia-Carpintero (2000) and Devitt (1996) offer a
thorough account of the senses of demonstratives, which is
similar in some respects to that of Campbell’s. The sense,
according to Garcia-Carpintero, is an ingredient of presup-
positions of acquaintance with the referent; “presupposi-
tions” meaning “propositions that are taken for granted”
when a statement is uttered. In this fashion, senses are indi-
viduating properties that allow the individuation of the ref-
erent.
Suppose one perceives something as being a house and
utters the statement “that is f” pointing at a certain object
(the house) and assigning it the property f (e. g. “beautiful”).
The term “that” is a singular term associated with the de-
scription “the f house”. According to Garcia-Carpintero,
when one uses the singular term “that” one takes oneself to
be acquainted with an object by having a ‘dossier’ for “the f
house”, which picks it out. The object fulfills the conditions
specified in the dossier, in our case the proposition “there is
a unique house most salient when the token t of ‘that’ is
produced and t refers to that house.” Now, the phrase “most
salient when t occurs” is equivalent to the expression “house
in such and such a location with such and such visual fea-
tures.” The “in such and such a place with such and such
visual features” is the mode of presentation of the token t of
the demonstrative “that”. This mode of presentation indi-
viduates the object to which the demonstrative refers.
The dossier of the object that acquaints one with the
object can be updated by new information, by adding con-
tents or by revising its content. One notes a distinction be-
tween an object being singled out as the referent of a de-
monstrative and its acquaintance dossier (file). The latter
ontologically presupposes the former; one needs an object to
create its dossier. One also needs to ensure that the object
with such and such features at time t1 is the same object with
such and such features at time t2. Perception must provide
for a mechanism that establishes the existence of an object
as a distinct entity and opens a dynamic file on it. One
needs, in other words, a mechanism that individuates the
demonstrata of perceptual demonstratives.
Object Individuation and Reference
Let us see where we stand with regard to the issue of
the reference of perceptual demonstratives related to object
individuation. When one uses a demonstrative one opens a
file for the object being demonstrated. According to the
psychological evidence, the first thing that this file does is
to individuate the object based on spatiotemporal informa-
tion. This ensures the existence of a distinct object whose
paths in space and time can be tracked. The object file thus
allows acquaintance with the referent of the demonstrative,
and in this sense, it constitutes its mode of presentation.
Kahneman’s “object-file” becomes a truncated version of
Garcia-Carpintero’s “dossier”, a dossier that contains only
spatiotemporal information. As the object moves in space-
time, feature detection mechanisms infuse the file with fea-
ture information allowing feature identification (the full
“dossier”.)
Let us investigate the power of the account sketched so
far with Brian Loar’s (1976) example, also used by Garcia-
Carpintero (2000) to argue that descriptive senses fix the
referents of the terms with which they are associated: Sup-
pose that Smith and Jones see a man on the train every
morning. One evening they watch a man being interviewed
on a television show, they are unaware that this man is the
same man they meet on the train every morning, and it so
happens that during the show they have just been talking
about the man on the train. Suppose now that Smith
switches his attention to the man on the television and says,
“he is a stockbroker”, referring to the man on the television.
Jones, unaware of Smith’s attention switch, takes Smith to
refer to the man on the train about whom they have been
talking. Though Jones has correctly identified the referent,
since the man on the train is the same as the man on the
television, one feels that Jones has failed to understand
Smith’s utterance. This shows that the manner of presenta-
tion of singular terms is important even on referential uses
for grasping the meaning of what is being communicated.
The upshot of Loar’s example is that although Jones’
belief to the effect that the man on the train is a stockbroker
has the same truth conditions as Smith’s belief that the man
on the television is a stockbroker (since the referent in both
beliefs is the same person), Smith is justified in holding his
belief, whereas Jones’ is not.
Jones missed the information that would have justified
his belief, because he does not know that the man on the
television and the man on the train are the same person. So,
for Jones, and thus information pertaining to the former
does not apply to the latter. To use the terminology of this
paper, Jones has two different object-files; one for the per-
son on the television and one for the person whom he meets
on the train. The role of the mode of presentation of a sin-
gular term is to clarify this point, namely whether the object
under consideration has been individuated the appropriate
way. Spatiotemporal information purports to do exactly that:
had Jones followed the spatiotemporal path of the person on
the train, he would have known that it is the same person
that appears on the television and he would have used all
relevant information to update that person’s object-file; so
his belief would have been just as justified as Smith’s.
 It seems thus, that object individuation (the mode of
presentation) is indispensable to fixing the referent of a per-
ceptual demonstrative. The individuation is accomplished
by opening an object-file fixing the object to which the de-
monstrative refers and allowing its tracking. In the course of
tracking, additional information, e. g. on shape and color,
may be added to the “dossier” to allow tracking in difficult
circumstances (as when one thing is inside some other
thing). It is essential for the success of concept grounding
and the escape from the regress of encodingism that this in-
dividuation process is not cognitively penetrable. No con-
ceptual content, no existing representations can be used in
the individuation process, so it has to be inaccessible to con-
scious content-laden processing. Also, individuation should
not be seen as establishing a concept – this is what happens
in the step of identification. Individuation just grounds the
concept, fixing it onto an object so that the concept can be
“filled” with information.
New Theories of Reference
If object individuation can fix reference and if object
individuation can be carried out without conceptual in-
volvement, then reference can be fixed in a nonconceptual
manner. Of course, this goes against the standard descriptive
theories of reference, according to which a sign is associated
with a concept in the mind, a “sense”, which constitutes its
meaning and determines what the sign refers to. It allows
one to pick out the objects in the environment that are ‘fall
under’ the concept. The reference of a word is fixed by cer-
tain of the descriptions associated with the word: that thing
over there counts as a “house”, given that it is a building
which could be used as a human dwelling.
A problem with these kinds of theories has been ex-
pressed in terms that remind strongly of the symbol
grounding problem: Devitt (1996, 159) argues that descrip-
tive theories of reference are incomplete because by ex-
plaining references by descriptions, they appeal to the appli-
cation of descriptions of other words; thus, they explain ref-
erence by appealing to the reference of other words. To es-
cape the lurking infinite regress, there must be some words
whose reference does not depend on that of other words,
that is words that are founded directly in the world.
Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975; 1983; 1991) have ar-
gued that the standard conception of reference fails for cer-
tain kinds of words, namely demonstratives, proper names
and natural kind terms. It is interesting to see whether our
notion of reference is compatible with Putnam’s (1975;
1983) direct-reference theory (“direct” in that it avoids the
mediation of conceptual content in establishing reference).
According to this theory, descriptions ascribing properties
would identify the wrong referents of the terms. Once a
causal contact between concept and object is established, the
world itself has a say on the fixing, what Putnam (1991) will
later call the “contribution of environment”.
Putnam (1991) argues that there is an indexical (deictic)
component that participates in reference fixing. When one
takes a liquid sample to be water, one does so because one
thinks that this liquid sample has a property, namely, “the
property of behaving like any other sample of pure water
from our environment” (Putnam 1991, 33). This property is
not a purely qualitative property (meaning that membership
is not determined by a set of criteria); its description in-
volves a particular example of water, one given by pointing
or focusing (hence, the term ‘“indexical”). The stuff out
there, to which the act of pointing is an essential part of
fixing reference of the natural kind term “water”, is the
contribution of the environment. Putnam says that “… the
extension of certain kinds of terms … is not fixed by a set of
‘criteria’ laid down in advance, but is, in part, fixed by the
world. There are objective laws obeyed by multiple sclero-
sis, by gold by horses, by electricity; and what it is rational
to include in these classes will depend on what those laws
turn out to be.” (Putnam 1983, 71). This brings into mind
the notion of causal chains by means of which demonstra-
tives refer, causal chains that are established through object
based and spatial attention.
Kripke (1980) refers to this assigning of names as “ini-
tial baptisms”. Suppose, that one points to a star and says,
“that is to be Alpha Centauri” (Kripke, 1980, 95). By this
one commits himself to the following: “By ‘Alpha Centauri’
I shall mean that star over there with such and such coordi-
nates.” Kripke (1980, 135) claims that the reference of gen-
eral natural kind terms is similarly fixed: “the reference (of
singular terms) can be fixed in various ways. In an initial
baptism ostentation or a description typically fixes it. …
The same observation holds for such a general term as
‘gold’.”
These are telling examples, because they point out the
role of spatial information and of object based attention in
fixing the reference of singular terms. The causal chain that
grounds the term starts with spatio-temporal non-descriptive
information that opens an object-file for some object. This
way of fixing the referents of singular and natural kind
terms captures adequately Kripke’s  intuition that: “Don’t
ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world,
except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can
point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in an-
other room, I am talking, by definition, about it.  I don’t have
to identify it after seeing it through a telescope. If I am
talking about it, I am talking about it.” (1980, 52-53).
Though Kripke speaks of proper names, his analysis easily
transfers to all singular terms, and thus, to perceptual de-
monstratives (Garcia-Carpintero, 2000). Names and indexi-
cals, are associated with something extralinguistic, their ref-
erents. Some existentially given thing is essential in fixing
these referents.
We have claimed that the mode of presentation of the
referent by its demonstrative is essential in reference fixing,
and we have argued that the mode of presentation fixes ref-
erence by opening an object-file for the referent of the de-
monstrative. This object-file includes spatiotemporal infor-
mation and its function is to individuate the referent, that is,
to establish the existence of a distinct body that perseveres
through space and time. It establishes the causal continuity
with the thing originally “pointed at” by the perceptual de-
monstrative, satisfying Putnam’s criterion for reference fix-
ing. It also provides the causal relation between the repre-
sentation and the world that grounds the former in the latter.
The object-file provides the indexical component that par-
ticipates in reference fixing. The content of the object-file
being retrieved in a bottom-up manner warrants that this
object file is the ‘contribution of the environment’ and not
the contribution of conceptual content.
Conclusion
We argue that perceptual demonstratives capture the es-
sential way in which one refers to objects in one’s experi-
ence. The sense of “demonstrative reference” involved,
however, departs from the notion of the referent as an object
that is individuated by some description. The representation
of the referent in the sense intended here does not encode
any featural properties, is pre-conceptual, and the process
that leads to its formation is cognitively impenetrable. The
only property that the individuated referent has is that it is
being tagged as a discrete object that persists in time and
occupies some space, and thus, is being rendered accessible
to the viewer. We claim that this process of reference fixing
provides the causal relation required to solve the grounding
problem.
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